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CHAPTER17 
Insurance 
ROBERT R. RICH, JR. 
A. COURT DECISIONS 
§17.1. Life insurance: Accidental death benefits: Proximate cause. 
In Vahey v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co.,1 plaintiff, the 
beneficiary, sued on two life insurance policies containing certain 
provisions for additional benefits payable in the event of ,the acci-
dental death of the insured. Specifically, the policies provided that 
recovery of the benefits could be had upon notice to the company 
and a showing "that the death of the insured was caused directly and 
independently of all other causes by a bodily injury sustained solely 
by external, violent and accidental means .... "2 However, no bene-
fit was payable if the death of the insured resulted "directly or in-
directly, or wholly or partially, from . . . any infection or bodily or 
mental infirmity or disease existing before ... the accidental injury .... "8 
The insured, an epileptic, had fallen during a seizure, fracturing his 
skull and suffering an epidural hemorrhage, as a result of which he died 
two days later. The trial court judge, sitting without a jury, found 
the benefits to be due plaintiff under the policy. On appeal, the issue 
was whether ,the death of the insured was "accidental" within the 
policy definitions and qualifications. The plaintiff contended that 
it was essential to draw a distinction between the cause of the acci-
dent or injury from which death resulted and ,the cause of death itself, 
stating that "if an accident is the sole cause of death, then the death 
cannot be said to have been the indirect result of anything else,4 and 
that the policies in question properly excused payment only if the 
death resulted from the pre-existing infirmity, not if the accident or 
injury causing the death so resulted. Rejecting plaintiff's argument, 
the Supreme Judicial Court reversed the decision below, in effect 
refusing to dichotomize the situation into one in which the sole cause 
of the death of the insured could be said to have been the accident. 
Instead, the Court held that; whenever a pre-existing disease or in-
firmity either "proximately causes or substantially contributes to 
the death"l1 of the insured, "such a death is not covered by that por-
ROBERT R. RICH, JR., is an attomey for New England Life Insurance Company, 
Boston, and an Instructor in Law at Boston College Law School. 
§17.1. 11969 Mass. Adv. Sh. 359,245 N.E.2d 251. 
2Id. at lI60 n.1, 245 N.E.2d at 252. 
8 Ibid. 
4Id. at lI6O, 245 N.E.2d at 252. 
II !d. at 1I61-lI62, 245 N.E.2d at 255. 
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tion of the policy which insures against death by accident or acciden-
tal means independently of all other causes. . . ."6 Finding that the 
death of the insured here resulted from a fall caused by his epilepsy, 
the Court denied plaintiff recovery. 
§17.2. Life insurance: Condition of insurability: Condition pre-
cedent. In Warren v. Confederation Life Assn.,1 the court of appeals 
affirmed the decision of the district court2 denying plaintiff recovery 
as beneficiary on a policy of life insurance. The facts, essentially un-
disputed, revealed that the applicant, plaintifFs son, had signed an 
application for insurance which contained a proviso that "[the] 
policy . . . [would] not take effect until . . . the policy has been de-
livered to the Applicant while the facts concerning the insurability 
of ... [the] insured are the same as described in this application .... "8 
In the application, which became a part of the policy, the plaintiff's 
son had stated that he was "in first class health and free from all symp-
toms of disease. . . .'" However, during the period from the date of 
application to the date of delivery of the policy (approximately three 
months), the deceased son had been hospitalized several times for 
epilepsy and drug ingestion. 
Defendant pressed its contention that the recital of "first class 
health" in the application, in conjunction with the proviso language 
of the application, combined to establish a "condition precedent" 
to the policy's taking effect. Defendant argued that the fact that the 
decedent was not in good health immediately prior to delivery of 
the policy was conclusive as a violation of the condition precedent 
so that the policy never became effective. Plaintiff contended that 
certain knowledge possessed by the defendant at the time of applica-
tion that the decedent son was not in first class health constituted 
a waiver of the proviso in the application. The court of appeals, not-
ing that "[t]he distinction between a misrepresentation on an appli-
cation ... which mayor may not be fatal, and a condition precedent, 
where substantial truth is an absolute requirement . . . is well rec-
ognized by ... Massachusetts courts/'ll held that the decedent's failure 
to maintain first class health until the date of delivery of the policy 
was an absolute bar to plaintiff's recovery. As to a waiver of the health 
requirements, the court found that, although defendant's knowledge 
at the time of application could possibly constitute a waiver until 
that date, the defendant could not be held to have waived the pro-
vision as to subsequent events of which it was ignorant. A further 
claim by plaintiff of waiver or estoppel because 'the soliciting agent 
6Id. at S62, 245 N.E.2d at 255. 
§17.2. 1401 F.2d 487 (1st Cir. 1968). For further discussion of the Warren case 
see §17.5 infra. 
2 Warren v. Confederation Ufe Assn., 282 F. Supp. 875 (D. Mass. 1968), noted in 
1968 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §15.lJ. 
8401 F.2d at 489. 
'Ibid. 
II Ibid. 
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of defendant did not read the proviso in the application to the dece-
dent was rejected by the court on the familiar contract ground that 
his acceptance of the policy bound him. to its provisions absent fraud 
or misrepresentation, of which there had been no allegation by plain-
tiff. 
Significantly for insurance law practitioners, the court in this case 
stated that, notwithstanding the propriety of using condition pre-
cedent language, such language "should be construed against the 
company at least to the extent of not permitting it to rely upon the 
literal wording to achieve a result not disclosed."s Such a statement 
may signify some judicial intent to diminish the efficacy of the con-
dition precedent defense. 
§I7.3. Casualty insurance: "Crime" insurance: Interpretation of 
policy language. Western Massachusetts Theaters, Inc. v. Liberty 
Mutual Insurance CO.l involved the interpretation of certain words 
in a so-called "crime policy" issued by defendant to plaintiff to cover 
plaintiff'S theater in Fall River. At a time when the theater was not 
open to the public, two young boys forced a rear exit door and, having 
gained entrance, proceeded to break into a candy and ice cream £reezer, 
taking a substantial amount of the contents; they also slashed the 
theater's picture screen. Plaintiff grounded its right to recovery on 
that portion of the policy in which defendant undertook to "pay for 
damage to the premises caused by robbery . . . or by or following 
burglarious entry into the premises, or attempt thereat."2 "Premises" 
was defined in the policy to be "those portions o£ the interior of any 
building which are occupied and controlled" by the insured; although 
"burglarious" was not defined, "burglary" was stated to be "the 
wrongful abstraction of merchandise, furnishings, fixtures and equip-
ment by any person . . . making felonious entry into the premises:' 
The Supreme Judicial Court, in affirming an appellate division re-
versal of the trial court, with one minor exception hereinafter to be 
considered, found it necessary to consider first, whether there was 
a "burglarious entry" in the face of defendant's contention that, be-
cause no evidence was introduced to support a finding that the boys 
had in fact removed any candy or ice cream from the theater, there 
was no "wrongful abstraction" giving rise to a burglary, and that 
the conduct of the boys was properly to be classified as vandalism. 
The Court viewed defendant's construction of the facts as unduly 
restrictive, noting that" '[a]bstraction' is not a word of settled tech-
nical meaning such as 'embezzlement' or 'larceny: "8 Thus, the Court 
found there to be a "burglarious entry" within the meaning of the 
policy. 
Next, the Court considered the question of whether the damage 
SId. at 490. 
§17.5. 11968 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1159,241 N.E.2d 826. 
2Id. at 1160,241 N.E.2d at 827. 
8 Id. at 1161, 241 N.E.2d at 828. 
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to the picture screen, candy and ice cream was within the coverage 
of the policy as constituting "damage to the premises." Pointing out 
"[t]he word 'premises' may have different meaings, depending upon ... 
[its] content ... ,"4 but finding that only in a peculiar context could 
it be said to include personal property, the Court found that recovery 
for these elements of damage was not within the proper purview 
of the policy language. In so finding, the Court conceded that the 
picture screen was a "fixture," but found that another section of the 
policy revealed an intent to differentiate between "premises" and 
"fixtures." Because the Court had held there was "burglarious entry," 
the Court modified the opinion of the appellate division granting 
recovery to plaintiff of the cost of repairing the exit door of the theater, 
which had been damaged in the course of the boys' gaining entrance. 
The defendant had conceded the correctness of this modification if 
a "burglarious entry" were found, presumably on the basis that the 
doors were clearly a part of the "premises." 
Although it cannot be doubted that the Court's decision is tech-
nically correct, it is questionable whether it does substantial justice. 
It seems clear that, unless such "fixtures" as the picture screen (val-
ued at $675 for replacement)1i were to be included in a crime policy, 
such a policy would be effectively of no value to the plaintiff, as it 
is usually the case that fixtures are the only items worthy of insurance 
in buildings dedicated to theater use, exclusive of personal property. 
It is felt that sufficient ambiguity was present in the language of the 
policy to justify a different conclusion as to the status of the picture 
screen, and hence the propriety of recovery for its damage. 
§17.4. Accident insurance: Damage to goods: Interpretation of 
policy language. The question before the Court in Beacon Textiles 
Corp. v. Employers Mutual Liability CO.1 was the proper interpreta-
tion to be afforded the word "accident" in an accident insurance 
policy issued to plaintiff by defendant. The facts of the case indicated 
that plaintiff had sold a substantial amount of yarn to a customer, 
which later turned color in sweaters knit by the customer, causing 
the customer damage of approximately $3700. Defendant denied cov-
erage for the loss, for which plaintiff was otherwise liable, on the 
basis of an exception to the general obligation of defendant to cover 
"all sums which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as 
damages because of injury ... caused by accident."lI The exception 
provided that the policy was inapplicable "to injury ... of ... any 
goods ... thereof manufactured ... by the ... insured ... of which 
the accident arises."B The defendant contended both that no "acci-
4 Ibid. 
Ii Id. at ll61 n.I, 241 N.E.2d at 827. 
§17.4. 11969 Mass. Adv. Sh. 599, 246 N.E.2d 671. 
1I Id. at 600, 246 N.E.2d at 672. 
B Ibid. 
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dent" had occurred and that, in any event, the injury was to "goods ... 
manufactured ... by the ... insured." 
The Court held that the change in color of the yam, due to an un-
explained latent defect, was an "accident," since "[t]he term 'accident' 
is to be broadly construed in a policy insuring damage against acci-
dent."4 It rejected, however, plaintiff's theory that the damage was 
to the sweaters, and hence not to plaintiff's goods, by adopting an 
analysis which viewed the sweaters as injured by the accidental in-
jury to the yam, a product of plaintiff, and within the exception to 
coverage. The Court therefore concluded that the extent of plain-
tiff's compensable loss was only that loss to the customer in having 
to sacrifice the sale of the sweaters which was independent of the yam. 
Such a loss could be calculated because although "in the sweaters 
the yam had ceased to have independent significance as a physical 
product ... it remained yam, and the dollar effect of the injury thereto 
[was] ... separately ascertainable."1i 
§17.5. Fire insurance: Notice of loss: Warranty policy. The 
plaintiff in Romanos v. Home Insurance CO.l purchased certain fire 
insurance policies from the Home Insurance Company (Home) and 
Underwriters at Lloyd's of London (Lloyd's) incident to a purchase 
of Boston real estate. The one policy issued by Home contained a 
provision requiring the insured to render "forthwith" a statement 
in writing containing certain information on any asserted loss. Of 
the three policies issued by Lloyd's, two were classified as so-called 
"cover notes" in that Lloyd's "[w]arranted the same terms and con-
ditions as and to follow the settlement of Home. . . ."2 The third 
Lloyd's policy contained no such "warranty clause." 
Although substantial damage was done to plaintiff's property by 
fire on November 30, 1958, it was not until January 29, 1959, that 
plaintiff forwarded to Home a sworn and written proof of loss. Prior 
to this latter date, Lloyd's had appointed an insurance adjuster to 
review the matter; but Home appointed no one. In March of 1959, 
Home rejected the claim of the plaintiff on the basis that the policy 
provision of "forthwith" report of loss had not been honored. Lloyd's 
also rejected plaintiff's claims against it on the basis of its "warranty 
clause." 
In affirming the decision of the trial court denying liability of the 
defendants Home and Lloyd's, the Supreme Judicial Court, held, 
first, that Home's right to stand on the prerequisite of "forthwith" 
notice of loss was not waived, and secortd that the failure of plaintiff 
to send such a statement "as soon as 'the exercise of reasonable dil-
igence ... (enabled) the assured to send it ... .'''3 was fatal to its 
4 Id. at 601, 241 N.E.2d at 673. 
Ii Ibid. 
§17.5. 11969 Mass. Adv. Sh. 451, 246 N.E.2d 1711. 
2Id. at 454, 246 N.E.2d at 176. 
3 Id. at 4511, 246 N .E.2d at 176. 
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claim. The interesting aspect of the case, however, pertains to the 
Lloyd's defense. Against plaintiff's claim. that the assignment of an 
adjuster by· Lloyd's must have constituted an implied waiver of any 
notice of loss,. the. Court responded by pointing out that Lloyd's was 
not relying "upon lateness of notice in connection with its refusal 
to settle the two policies containing the warranty clause .... "Ii Rather, 
it was Lloyd's position - a position which "commended itself" to 
the Court - that the warranty clause in the two policies effectively 
vested Lloyd's with an absolute derivative liability, so that any de-
fense of Home sufficient to avoid liability would, ipso facto, free 
Lloyd's from liability as well, notwithstanding any action on the part 
of Lloyd's which, if taken by Home, would have constituted an es-
toppel or waiver of Home's defenses. lti holding Lloyd's not to be 
liable on its two "warranty clause" policies, the Court regarded com-
pliance with the warranty as a condition precedent to recovery. Al-
though conduct on the part of an insurer in Lloyd's position in the 
instant case can be envisioned to be. so grossly inequitable as 10 con-
stitute fraud on an insured, the reasoning of the Court in Romanos 
would seem to compel a finding of nonliability of such an insurer 
under its policy. It is not, therefore, unreasonable to expect that the 
Court will, if. such a case should come before it, retreat significantly 
from' the position adopted in Romanos that the presence of a war-
ranty clause in the policy of an insurer has the effect of placing that 
insurer in the shoes of a principal insurer for the purpose of obtain-
ing the benefits of the principal insurer's defenses to an asserted 
claim. 
§17.6. Motor vehicle insurance: Interpretation of policy language. 
In F. W. Woolworth Co. v. Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty CO.,1 the 
Supreme Judicial CoUrt had occasion to reconsider the proper scope 
of the. ,words "use" and "loading and unloading" in motor vehicle 
liability insurance issued to a common carrier. Defendant had issued 
such a policy to its insured, Hopkins Transportation, Inc. (Hopkins), 
in which policy coverage was extended to include "loading and un-
loading" of the vehicle as constituting an insured "use of the motor 
vehicle." 
On the day in question, Hopkins' servant was delivering certain 
merchandise to the Arlington store of plaintiff F. W. Woolworth 
Company (Woolworth), which premises were covered by a public 
liability policy issued by the plaintiff Travelers Insurance Company 
(Travelers). After all the merchandise had been removed from Hop-
kins' truck. by employees of Woolworth, who had taken each piece 
from the tailgate of the truck as it was placed there by Hopkins' ser-
vant, one Miss Ervin, a lady approximately 80 years old, fell into 
• This is in substance the provision of G.L., Co 175, §102. 
IS 1969 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 454, 246 N.E.2d at 176. 
§17.6. 11969 Mass. Adv. Sh. 121, 245 N.E.2d 919. 
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an open chute in the sidewalk. The chute had its covers removed 
and was being utilized by Woolworth employees to send the merchan-
dise to Woolworth's storeroom. At the time of the accident, all the 
merchandise was either already in the storeroom or on the sidewalk 
shortly to be sent to the storeroom via the chute, and Hopkins' ser-
vant had already received both a signed receipt for the merchandise 
and payment of his charges from Woolworth employees. 
In a suit by Woolworth and Travelers seeking to require defen-
dant to reimburse them for a part of sums paid Miss Ervin in settle-
ment of her claim, the trial court decreed that the accident to Miss 
Ervin "was caused by and arose out of the use and unloading of (Hop-
ltins') truck"2 by Woolworth and its employees, and defendant was 
ordered to pay $3,566.66 each to Woolworth and Travelers, with in-
terest. All parties appealed. 
In reversing the decision of the trial court, the Supreme Judicial 
Court placed gre~t emphasis on the fact that all merchandise had 
been removed from Hopkins' truck at the time of the accident so that 
Hopkins' employee "had nothing left to do except to remove the 
Hopkins truck from the curb."S Thus, the case was distinguishable 
from an earlier Massachusetts case, August A. Busch & Co. v. Liberty 
Mutual Insurance Co.' The Court nevertheless considered the prin-
ciples established in that case controlling. In the Busch case, the Court 
had held that language essentially similar to that contained in the 
Lumbermen's Insurance Company policy 
... was intended to extend the coverage of "use of the ... ve-
hicle" to include "unloading" in the sense of delivery to the .. " . 
consignee rather than the more restricted doctrine that the un-
loading has ended when the goods have come to rest.1I 
The Court thus adopted "the so-called 'complete operation' rule and 
rejected. the 'coming to rest' doctrine."11 The Court further stated 
that "for Busch, the insured hirer of the vehicle there unloaded, 'un-
loading would mean a continuous transaction ending with the de~ 
posit of the goods in the hands of the purchaser:"'1 In Busch, the 
Busch employees were still significantly engaged in the process of 
unloading and storage when the accident occurred, and for this rea-
son the Court held Busch's insurer liable under the "unloading" 
provision of the applicable policy. As the process of unloading the 
Hopkins truck had been completed, and the trucker and its employees 
"[had] made the delivery they were reasonably expected to make 
and ... [had] ceased to participate ... ,"8 the Woolworth employees 
2Id. at 121, 245 N.E.2d at 920. 
8 Id. at 124, 245 N .E.2d at 921. 
'5!l9 Mass. 2!l9, 158 N.E.2d !l51 (1959). 
1I!l!l9 Mass. at 242-24!l, 158 N.E.2d at !l5!l. 
61969 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 12!l, 24!l N.E.2d at 921. 
7 Ibid. 
8Id. at 125, 245 N.E.2d at 922. 
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could not be said to be "using" the Hopkins truck at the time of the 
accident. The Court therefore concluded that the trial judge had in-
correctly concluded that unloading had not ceased, and held that a 
decree was to be entered absolving defendant of liability for the in-
juries sustained by Miss Ervin. 
§17.7. Motor vehicle insurance: Cancellation: Estoppel of insurer. 
Plaintiff in Caravan v. Hanover Insurance CO.l sought to reach and 
apply proceeds of a motor vehicle insurance policy issued by defen-
dant and covering one Graves, against whom plaintiff had obtained 
a judgment in a tort action arising when plaintiff was struck by an 
automobile owned and operated by Graves. Graves was insured by 
defendant as a result of a referral by an independent insurance agent, 
which agent had filled out the appropriate rating form and applica-
tion for registration. Defendant's agent subsequently completed the 
application and accepted the premium payment, which . payment 
was made by a finance company, a fact so noted irr the file at defen· 
dant's office. In the process of completing the application form the 
independent agent had incorrectly typed Graves' address as 35 D 
Street, South Boston, instead of 35 B Street. When defendant mailed 
the policy to Graves, the envelope was therefore returned marked 
"No such number." After a second unsuccessful attempt to mail the 
policy, defendant sent a statutory notice of cancellation pursuant 
to G.L.,c. 175, §1l3A(2), again to the incorrect address, which notice 
was also returned marked "No such number." No notice of cancella-
tion was ever received by Graves. The trial court made rulings that 
(I) the mere sending of notice of cancellation with no effort to ascer-
tain the correctness of the address after knowledge of the incorrectness 
of the address used was ineffectual to cancel the policy, and (2) defen-
dant was estopped to avail itself of the fact of cancellation against 
the plaintiff. 
In affirming the decree of the trial court, the Supreme Judicial 
Court noted that, notwithstanding a number of documents in defen-
dant's files which, if consulted, could have afforded means to ascer-
tain Graves' correct address, defendant at no time had made any 
effort to ascertain the correct address of its insured. Such conduct, 
the Court held, was sufficient to constitute an estoppel. The argument 
of the defendant to the effect that the typographical error was the 
mistake of Graves' agent (the independent insurance agent), and not 
that of defendant or its agents, thus distinguishing the case from prior 
precedent cited favorably by the Court,! wall not accepted by the 
Court; nor could the Court accept defendant's contention that its 
failure to utilize information in its possession to ascertain the true 
address of its insured was not effective to create an estoppel in view 
§17.7. 11969 Mass. Adv. Sh. 87S, 248 N.E.2d 27l. 
21n Greenberg v. Flaherty, lI06 Mass. 95, 27 N.E.2d 68S (1940), where the insured's 
application was incorrectly filled in by agents of the insurer with the result that the 
insured never received notice of cancellation, it was held that the canteUation was 
dfettive but that the insurer was estopped to avail itself of that fa~. 
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of the fact of defendant's compliance with Section. l1SA of the Gen-
eral Laws. The Court found it unnecessary to consider the provisions 
of Section 113A, since it could be conceded that the notice of cancel-
lation might have been effective in view of the fact that the Court 
found an estoppel to have been created by defendant's conduct. De-
fendant's contrary contention the Court found to be in disregard 
of the purpose of the compulsory motor vehicle law: to protect trav-
elers on the public ways by providing compensation for their injuries 
when inflicted through operation of automobiles insured by the 
owners.s 
§17.8. Motor vehicle insurance: Classification of risks and estab-
lishment of premium charges: Insurance rate "freeze." In one of 
the most publicized decisions of the Supreme Judicial Court in the 
1969 SURVEY year, Insurance Rating Bd. v. Commissioner of Insur-
ance,1 the Court was called upon to consider the authority of the 
Commissioner of Insurance (commissioner) to "freeze" certain auto-
mobile insurance rates. The plaintiffs, Insurance Rating Board (board), 
Mutual Insurance Rating Bureau (bureau), and several insurance 
companies argued that the attempted "freeze" was both illegal as a 
result of a mistaken interpretation of statutory directive, and uncon-
stitutional as a violation of the legal protection clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. By Acts of 
1968, Chapter 643, the commissioner was directed, in Section 2A, to 
"fix ... the same classifications of risks and the same basic premium 
charges ... in connection with the issue of motor vehicle liability 
policies or bonds ... as he fixed ... for ... (1967)."2 By Section 3 
of Chapter 643, G.L., c. 175, §1l3C, was amended to require insur-
ance companies authorized to issue compulsory bodily injury liability 
("compulsory") policies or bonds 
. . . to issue to any person purchasing such policy or bond, at 
his option, additional coverage of property damage ... to a 
limit of at least five thousand dollars ... [t]he rates for such ad-
ditional coverage ... [to be] subject to the approval of the com-
missioner, under the provisions of [§113B).3 
On November 25, 1968, approximately one month after the board 
and bureau had filed with the commissioner approved rating rules 
covering the rating of the additional property damage liability cov-
erage described by Chapter 613,4 the commissioner filed a "Memo-
randum" in his office purporting, in effect, to reaffirm - or "freeze" -
all classifications of risks, premium charges and other regulation ap-
S Caravan v. Hanover Ins. Co., 1969 Mass. Adv. Sh. 873, 876,248 N.E.2d 271, 273. 
§17.8. 11969 Mass. Adv. Sh. 967, 248, N.E.2d 500. 
2Id. at 968, 238 N.E.2d at 502. 
SIbid. 
4 The rules were filed on October 14, 1968, also the effective date of Chapter 643. 
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plicable to all motor vehicle policies or bonds, including the classi-
fications applicable. to property damage liability insurance under 
the amended G,L., c. 175, §1l3C, on the basis of the 1967 classifica-
tions. Subsequent to the filing of the memorandum, the commissioner 
returned to the board and bureau purported filings regarding prop-
erty damage liability insurance on the ground that these filings were 
"inconsistent with ... [his] Memorandum ... of November 25, 1968."11 
It was the contention of the commissioner that the rate "freeze" pro-
vision of Chapter 643, Section 2A, was applicable to property damage 
liability insurance because the legislature, in using the words "policies 
or bonds," as opposed to the word "€overage," must have intended 
to indude all coverage contained in policies or bonds containing 
"compulsory" coverage, and not merely the "compulsory" coverage. 
The Court rejected the rationale of the commissioner, noting that 
the interpretation given by the Court to the phrase "motor vehicle 
liability policy," in prior casesS dealing with the proper scope of that 
phase as it appears in G.L., c.175, §1l3A, had been limited to "com-
pulsory" coverage and that substantially the same wording was used 
by the legislature in Chapter 643. The provisions of Chapter 643, 
the Court therefore concluded, neither required nor authorized the 
commissioner to "freeze" automobile property damage liability in-
surance rates. 
The board and. the bureau also argued that the provision of Chap-
ter 643, Section 3, requiring insurance companies "to issue to any 
person purchasing . . . ['compulsory'], at his option, additional cov-
erage ... of property damage ... ," (emphasis added) applied only 
to those persons who were not "voluntarily" offered property damage 
coverage by the companies in conjunction with "compulsory" since 
a voluntary offering would negate the exercise of any "option" by 
the insured. Such a labored construction of legislative intent was 
summarily rejected by the Court, which stated: 
... We believe that the words "at his option" signify nothing 
more than a desire by the Legislature to make clear that, although 
the insurance companies issuing ..• ["compulsory"] are required 
to offer certain ... [property damage coverage], the insured is 
not required to purchase it.' 
The board and the bureau advanced its "equal protection" argu-
ment in the guise of a contention that a requirement forcing the in-
II Insurance Rating Bel. v. Commissioner of Ins. 1969 Mass. Adv. Sh. 967, 969, 
2118 N.E.2d 500, 5011. 
S Benoit v. Fisher, !l41 Man. !l86, !l88, 169 N.E.2d 905, 907 (1960) (requirements of 
§llllA not applicable t-o property damage coverage): Lodge v. Bern, !l28 Man. 42, 411-
44, 101 N.E.2d 748, 749 (1951) (provisions of §llllA forbidding exclusions from 
compulsory coverage said to have "no application to the coverage in excess of the 
required $5000'1. 
'l Insurance Rating Bd. v. Commissioner of Ins., 1969 Man. Adv. Sh. 967, 971, 
2118 N.E.2d 500, 504. 
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surance companies to issue such additional property damage coverage 
as is mandated in Chapter 643, Section 3, was unconstitutional as 
making "unreasonable distinctions among insurance companies writ-
ing ... [property damage coverage]."8 The Court was unpersuaded, 
however, that the statutory directive in Chapter 643, Section 3, con-
stituted an infringement of the constitutional rights of the companies. 
The Court stated that no distinction was drawn between companies; 
the only distinction was between policies issued by the companies.9 
The companies were not prohibited from issuing property damage 
coverage in conjunction with "compulsory"; nor were they required 
to seek approval of the commissioner for property damage coverage 
in excess of the required amount of $5000 in Chapter 643, Section 
3. The companies were free to file under G.L., c. 175A, with respect 
to any excess over the $5000. 
In addition to the considerations discussed above, the Court re-
solved, in favor of the commissioner, two further issues involving 
the propriety of the commissioner's actions in fixing rates subsequent 
to the September 15 deadline set forth in G.L., c. 175, §1l3B. Although 
the Court found there to have been certain technical abnormalities 
in the procedure adopted by the commissioner, it noted that absolute 
compliance with the statute would have been rendered not feasible 
in view of the lateness of the rate filings by the board and bureau-
December 26, 1968 - and the consequent inadequacy of the time in 
which the commissioner might have acted under Section 113B. 
B. LEGISLATION 
§I7.9. Liability insurance. Chapter 1431 of the Acts of 1969 permits 
the insured under a policy of liability insurance written to cover 
losses in excess of those covered by an underlying policy - such as, for 
example, the insured under a typical motor vehicle policy - to include 
both his spouse and unmarried dependent children under the age of 
23 in the policy coverage with respect to medical expenses greater 
than a "stated deductible amount." Stated deductible amount is defined 
to be the greater of (I) the minimum deductibles shown in the declara-
tion of the policy or (2) the amount of benefits available for eligible 
medical expenses under other medical expense coverage. 
§I7.IO. Automobile insurance. Chapter 1471 of the Acts of 1969 
provides that a policy of insurance covering a motor vehicle being 
transferred shall continue to cover that motor vehicle in the hands of 
the new owner until the expiration of two business days after the date 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid. 
§17.9. 1 G.L., c. 175, §lllG. 
§17.l0. 1 G.L., c. 175, §llSA. 
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of transfer within the period for which the transferred vehicle was 
registered; provided that the number plates' issued upon registration 
of the transferred vehicle are attached to the newly acquired vehicle. 
Chapter 14;7 thus alters a previous amendment to Chapter 175, Section 
113A, of the General Laws2 which had provided that such coverage 
was effective only if the two business days fell within the same calendar 
year as the date of transfer. Under the present Section 113A, as 
amended by Chapter 147, vehicles whose registration periods straddle 
two calender years suffer no discrimination because of this fact. 
§17.11. Group life insurance. Possibly the most important change 
in Massachusetts insurance legislation during the 1969 SURVEY year 
was effected by Chapter 1561 of the Acts of 1969. By this statute an 
insured under a policy of group life insurance may, subject to policy 
restrictions, assign any and all incidents of ownership of such policy, 
including the right to designate a beneficiary thereunder, to have an 
individual policy issued him upon termination either of employment 
or of the group policy, and. to pay premiums. By Section 3 of Chapter 
156, this new statute is to be construed as declaratory of the law prior 
to its enactment, and not as modifying, altering or amending any law. 
As enacted, Chapter 156 represents an effort by the legislature to 
deal with the implications of the Landor! decision,2 which held, inter 
alia, that although the question of retention of incidents of ownership 
in a group life insurance policy which a decedent had assigned to his 
wife was a federal question, the question could turn on state law.S 
Looking to the insurance and property law of the state of New York, 
stipulated by the parties to be applicable, the court ultimately deter-
mined that, while "[n]either the courts of the State ... nor its legis-
lature has directed itself to these specific questions . . . ,"4 local law 
neither prohibited nor approved assignment of group policies. The 
court therefore concluded that group life insurance policies were no 
less assignable under New Y9,Tk law than ordinary life insurance 
policies, II which are, of course, fully assignable. 
Because the increased flexibility offered by Landor! in estate planning 
could be insured with relative certainty by a statute declaring that 
group policies are assignable under the law of Massachusetts, the legis-
lature promptly enacted Chapter 156. Other jurisdictions will undoubt~ 
edly enact variants of the Massachusetts statute to insure the same 
benefits for their citizens.s 
2 Acts of 1961, c. 568, §2. 
§17.11. 1 G.L., c. 175, §IMC. 
2 Landorf v. United States, 408 F.2d 461 (Ct. Cl. 1969). 
8Id. at 466. 
4 Ibid. 
IIId. at 468. 
S New York, for example, approved and enacted such a statute shortly after 
Massachusetts had done so. Laws of New York 1969, c. 843, amending N.Y. Ins. 
Law §161 (McKinney 1966). 
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§17.12. Fire insurance. By Chapter 4251 of the Acts of 1969, the 
number of days of written notice of cancellation of a fire insurance 
policy required to be given an insured by a company has been increased 
from 10 to 20. This new provision, however, applies only to policies 
issued on or after January I, 1970. . 
§17.18. Fire insurance. By the terms of Chapter 5281 of the Acts 
of 1969, the provisions of the Urban Area Insurance Placement Facility 
Act2 have been amended to insure that property owners in urban areas 
can obtain needed fire insurance policies and extended coverage 
endorsements from the insurance companies. Under Chapter 528, the 
extent of the coverage which the companies are required to offer is 
made subject to the determination of the commissioner of insurance 
after public hearing or a rule of the secretary of the United States De-
partment of Housing and Urban Development in accordance with the 
Urban Property Protection and Reinsurance Act of 1968 (Pub. L. No. 
90-448).3 
§17.14. Life insurance. Chapter 7471 of the Acts of 1969 increases 
from 5 to 6 percent the rate of interest which insurance companies 
are allowed to charge on loans against any policy of life insurance. By 
Section 2 of Chapter 747, this new rate of interest is not available to the 
companies on policies issued before the effective date of the Act, which, 
by virtue of emergency declaration filed by the governor, was August 
20, 1969. 
C. STUDENT COMMENT 
§17.15. Condition precedent: The "good health" clause: Warren v. 
Confederation Life Assn.1 Deceased, a citizen of Massachusetts, ap-
plied for a life insurance policy in which plaintiff was named bene-
ficiary. The policy was applied for on May 5, 1966, from the defendant, 
a Canadian corporation. The first premium was paid on August 5, 
1966, with the effective delivery of the policy considered to be on 
August 1, 1966. 
In the application the deceased disclosed that he had been treated 
by a Dr. Drachman in 1963 for fainting spells. He failed to disclose 
treatment by that physician for subsequent seizure disorders in 1964 
and 1965. The deceased also disclosed that from 1963 to 1965 he had 
been treated by another physician, a Dr. Reusch. Dr. Reusch, unaware 
of the seizure disorders being treated by Dr. Drachman, was contacted 
§17.I2. 1 C.L., c. 175, §99. 
§17.1~. 1 C.L., c. 175C, §§1-4, 8. 
2 C.L., c. 175C. 
312 U.S.C. §17015. 
§17.14. 1 C.L., c. 175, §142. 
§17.15. 1401 F.2d 487 (1st Cir. 1968). 
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by the defendant insurance company. Dr. Drachman was not. Before 
and after the application on May 5, 1966, the deceased was treated for 
seizure disorders and ingestion of drugs. 
One of the· questions asked in the application was: II Are you now 
in first-class health and £ree from all symptoms of disease?" The deceased 
answered "yes." The application, which became part of the policy, also 
provided, in part, as follows: 
The Applicant declares that the above answers are full and true 
and agrees that: ... any policy issued pursuant to this application 
will not take effect until the first premium has been paid and the 
policy has been delivered to the Applicant while the facts con-
cerning the insurability of any person whose life is thereby insured 
are the same as described in the application .•.. 2 
Between the time of application (and also the medical examination 
by defendant insurance company) in May, and the date of delivery in 
August, the deceased was twice treated in June for seizure disorders; 
once in July for a disorder diagnosed as epilepsy; and once more in 
July for an overdose of medication. None of these postapplication 
treatments were reported to the defendant. The insured died on 
October 24, 1966. 
At the trial in the district court, the defendant contended that 
because the deceased had, in the application, stated that he was in 
"first class health" and free fro1n all symptoms of disease," and as he was 
not in such "good health" on August 1, the policy never took effect. 
The trial judge entered a judgment n.o.v. for the defendant.8 
On appeal the plaintiff beneficiary argued that the defendant knew 
or should have known that the deceased was not "in first class health" 
on the date of the filing of the application, May 5, and therefore waived 
any condition precedent which may have been' established by the above 
quoted statement from the application. The First Circuit Court of 
Appeals, in affirming the lower court, HELD: The statement in the 
application, which is deemed part of the policy, created a condition 
precedent, effective between the:application date and the delivery date, 
which was violated by the dece~ed'shospitalization during that period. 
The company did not waive, nor was it estopped from enforcing, this 
condition. 
Warren involves the area of representations and conditions. in insur-
ance policies that deal with "good health" clauses .• It turns upon the 
decedent's answer in the application that he was "in first class health 
2Id. at 489. 
B Warren v. Confederation Life AIm., 282 F. Supp. 575 (D. M~. 1968) • 
• The term "good health" clause is used to describe various types of clauses in 
insurance policies whereby the companies attempt to protect themselves by con-
ditioning the coverage provided in the policies on the existence of the insured's 
good health at the time of payment of the first premium. The interpretation of 
these clauses in the various jurisdictions varia widely. 
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and fr~ from all symptoms of disease." The law in this area, char~ 
acterized by a conflict of opinion, is susceptiple to change in inter-
pretation.· 
In Massachusetts, answers in insurance applications are considered 
representations if unaltered by other clauses in the policy or applica-
tion.1I This being the case, they would normally fall under the law of 
misrepresentations if they were false in content. A representation is a 
written or oral statement of fact made by the applicant to induce the 
insurer to contract, being collateral to the contract once formed.8 A 
warranty is a written or oral fact which constitutes a part of the 
contract between the parties.T 
At common law a warranty demanded exact and literal truth as a 
neceS$ary condition of the right to recover, however immaterial the 
statement may have been.s It was considered to be a part of the con-
tract itself,9 defining the limits of obligation.1o 1£ the terms of the 
warranty were not met exactly then no contract resulted.11 The 
burden was on the party claiming recovery to show exact compliance 
with all waranties.12 A representation at common law, however, was 
treated differently. It did not, like a warranty, require strict and 
literal compliance. That is, only substantial compliance was required 
in those particulars which were material to be disclosed to the insurer 
in order to enable them to determine whether they would enter into 
the contract.1S Its relation to the contract was usually described by the 
term collateral.14 The burden was on the defendant, attempting to 
void the policy, to prove a material misrepresentation.lII In neither 
warranty nor representation, however, was good faith or intention a 
II Giannelli v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co .• 807 Mass. 18. 29 N.E.2d 124 (1940); 
White v. Provident Savings Life Assurance Society of New York. 165 Mass. 108. 59 
N.E. 771 (1895); Barre Boot Co. v. Milford Mutual Fire Ins. Co .• 89 Mass. 42 
(1863); See Kappes. Misrepresentation as it Relates to Policies of Ordinary Life 
Insurance. 1965 ABA Section of Insurance. Negligence and Compensation Law 65. 74. 
81 MacGillivray on Insurance Law §795 (5th ed .• D. Browne. 1961). 
TId. §895. 
S Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Burno. 509 Mass. 7. 8. 53 N.E.2d 519. 520 (1941); 
White v. Provident Savings Life Assurance Society of New York. 165 Mass. 108. lI9 
N.E. 771 (1895); See. Note. Misrepresentation and False Warranty under the Illinois 
Insurance Code: Recent Developments. 54 Nw. U.L Rev. 275 (1959-1960) (herein-
after cited as Recent Developments). 
9 Campbell v. New England Mutal Life Ins. Co .• 98 Mass. lISl (1867). 
10 Ibid. 
11 White v. Provident Savings Life Assurance Society of New York. 165 Mass. 
108. 59 N.E. 771 (1895); Vase v. Eagle Life So: Health Ins. Co .• 60 Mass. 42 (1850). 
12 Barker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.. 198 Mass. 575. 84 N.E. 490 (1908); 
Campbell v. New England Mutual Life Ins. Co., 98 Mass. 381 (1867). 
18 Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Burno. !lO9 Mass. 7, 33 N.E.2d 519 (1941); White 
v. Provident Savings Life Assurance Society of New York, 165 Mass. 108, lI9 N.E. 
771 (1895); See Taylor, The Life Insurance Law of Massachusetts, 19 B.U.L. Rev. 
55 (1939). 1. 98 Mass. at 390. 
11198 Mass. at 590; Daniels v. Hudson River Fire Ins. Co., 66 Mass. 416. 426 (1855). 
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factor in the decision.18 In both cases concealment, as well as misstate-
ment, would suffice to void the pOlicy.17 
In reaction to the harsh effects of the common law of warranties, the 
Massachusetts legislature, as did many other legislatures, altered by 
statute the law of representation and warranty as applied to insurance 
policies.18 This statute, in effect, eliminated any distinction in law 
between a representation and warranty. 111 The scope of materiality in 
misrepresentations was increased by allowing fraud alone to avoid a 
policy.20 The statute created a common rule as to the burden of proof. 
That burden was placed upon the party trying to void the policy, by 
showing either intent to deceive or a material increase of the risk 
assumed, by a preponderance of the evidence.21 It should be noted that 
the courts have held that the misrepresentation does not have to be 
germain to the death of the insured to be material,22 and that the ques-
tions of intent and increase of risk are normally ones for the jury.23 
The courts have, on occasion, however, ruled that misstatements about 
certain diseases increase the risk as a matter of law. Included are mis-
representations about cancer,24 Hodgkins disease,211 diabetes,28 tuber-
culosis,27 age of the insured,28 and chronic excessive drinking.29 
Not only false statements, but failure to disclose one's medical 
16 98 Mass. at 396. 
17 Clark v. Manufacturers' Ins. Co., 49 U.s. 235, 247 (1850); Dlmie1s v. Hudson 
River Fire Ins. Co., 66 Mass. at 425. 
18 G.L., c. 175, §186. "No oral or written misrepresentation OJ' warranty made 
in the negotiation of a policy of insurance by the insured or in his behalf shall 
be deemed material or defeat or avoid the policy or prevent its attaching unless 
such misrepresentation or warranty is made with actual intent to deceive, or 
unless the matter misrepresented or made a warranty increased the risk of loss." 
19 Nonantum Ins. Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 56 F.2d 329 (1st Cir. 1932); 
Giannelli v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., lI07 Mass. at 22, 29 N.E.2d at 126; Barker v. 
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 198 Mass. lI75, 84 N.E. 490 (1908). 
20 Taylor, The Life Insurance Law of Massachusetts, 19 B.U.L. Rev. 53 (1939). 
21 New York Life Ins. Co. v. Simons, 60 F.2d 30 (1st Cir. 19l12); Schiller v. 
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 295 Mass. 169, 171, 3 N.E.2d lI84, 385 (19116); Foss v. 
Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York, 247 Mass. 10, 141 N.E. 498 (1923). 
22 Lennon v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., lIlI9 Mass. '1,7, 157 N.E.2d 
518 (1959). . 
23 Schiller v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 295 Mass. at 178, II N.E.2d at lI88; Foss 
v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York, 247 Mass. 10, 141 N.E. 498 (192'1,); Kelly v.' 
Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York, 207 Mass. lI98, 911 N.E. 695 (1911); Barker v. 
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 198 Mass. lI75, 84 N.E.490 (1908); Levie: v. Metropolitan 
Life Ins. Co., 163 Mass. 117, lI9 N.E. 792 (1895). 
24Lennon v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins; Co., 3119 Mass. lI7, 157 N.E.2d 518 
(1959). 
211 Pahigian v. Manufacturers' Life Ins. Co., 1I49 Mass. 78, 206 N.E.2d 660 (1965). 
28See DeGuzzi v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 242 Mass. 5.58, U6 N.E. 617 
(1922). 
27 Brown v. Greenfield Life Assn., 172 Mass. 498, 511 N.E. 129 (1899). 
28 See Dolan v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Assn., 182 Mass. 41l1, 6.1) N.E. 798 (Iooll). 
29 The Merchants National Bank of Newburyport v. New York Life Ins. Co., !146 
Mass. 745, 196 N.E.2d 201 (1964); Rainger v. Boston Mutual Life Assn., 167 Mass. 
109, 44 N.E. 1088 (1896). 
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history,80 and failure to disclose new developments occurring before 
delivery of the policy have been held to be misrepresentations that act 
to void the policy.81 In Massachusetts, "the representations ... must 
be regarded in law as though they were made at the time the policy 
was delivered."82 Also, "a failure by the insured to disclose conditions 
affecting the risk, of which he is aware, make the contract voidable 
at the insurer's option."" The emphasis in the representation area is 
on a willful concealment by the insured,84 or at least the concealing 
of informatioD critical to the insurer's decision of which the insured 
was aware.811 
When the insurer seeks to void the policy by reason of a misrepre-
sentation which allegedly increased the risk, it is necessary to demon-
strate a degree of materiality of the misrepresentation.88 The degree 
of materiality in Massachusetts is stated as "every such fact ... must be 
regarded as material, the knowledge or ignorance of which would 
naturally influence the judgment of the underwriter in making the 
contract at all, or in estimating the degree and character of the risk, 
or in fixing the rate of the premium."8T 
A distinction is made as to representations of "good health" by an 
insured in an application which sets them apart from the ordinary 
representations of facts. The Court in Rappe v. Metropolitan Life 
Insurance CO.88 stated the Massachusetts view that: 
•.. Such a question as this, as well as the question whether the 
insured ever had an 'illness,' is so indefinite that a wide allowance 
must be made for difference of opinion or judgment as to what 
80New York Life Ins. Co. v. Simons, 60 F.2d 110 (1st Cir. 19112); Pahigian v. 
Manu(acturers' Life Ins. Co., 1149 Mass. 78, 206 N.E.2d 660 (1965); See also Kaffanges 
v. New. York Life Ins. Co., 59 F.2d 475 (Ist Cir. 19112), where the decision could 
poaibly be read to make the effect of epilepsy a material increase of the risk. by 
law. For a discussion of disclosure, see Witherspoon, What is the Ultimate Effect of 
the "Good Health" Clause? Federation of Insurance Quarterly 22 (Summer 1967). 
81Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Hub Hosiery Mills, 74 F. Supp. 599 (D. Mass. 1947); 
Lennon v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 3119 Mass. 117, 157 N.E.2d 518 (1959); 
Gabbett v.Connecticut General Life Ins. Co., 11011 Mass. 4311, 21 N.E.2d 950 (1939); 
See 1959 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §16.1I. 
82 Gabbett v. Connecticut General Life Ins. Co., BOll Mass. at 435, 21 N.E.2d at 
952. 
88 Ibid. 
"New York Life Ins. Co. v. Simons, 60 F.2d 110 (1st Cir. 1932); Aetna Life Ins. 
Co. v. Hub Hosiery Mills, 74 F. Supp. 599 (D. Mass. 1947). 
811 Pahigian v. Manufacturers' Life Ins. Co., 1149 Mass. 78, 206 N.E.2d 660 (1965); 
Lennon v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 11119 Mass. 117, 157 N.E.2d 518 (1959); 
see Witherspoon, What is the Ultimate Effect of the "Good Health" Clause? Federa-
tion of Insurance Quarterly 22, 28 (Summer 1967). 
88 For a discussion of the standard used in judging materiality, see Comment, 
Material Misrepresentation as a Requirement for R.escission of Insurance Contracts, 
711 Dick. L. R.ev. 250 (1968-1969); 12 J. Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice 
§7294 (l94l1). 
81 Daniels v. Hudson River Fire Ins. Co., 66 Mass. at 425. 
III! ~ MMs. 1176, 69 N.E.2d 584 (1946). 
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constitutes good or bad health or an ilIDess:These questions cannot· 
be construed as calling for more than opinion, or a statement to 
the best of the applicant's knowledge and belief.8' ' 
> • 
The emphasis is placed on the .good faith of the insured in an effort 
to make the situation as equitable as possible, the' purpose of the 
i~nce application being to place the insurer in, as good a position 
to judge the risk as is the insured.40 The Rappe rule is an attempt to 
prevent the insurer from gaining an unfair advantage op a good faith 
applicant. In this attempt, "[t]he courts are inclined to construe a 
representation or warranty as one of opinion whenever it is possible 
to do 'So, in order to prevent the forfeiture of polipesby rea89n of 
innocent mistake."ft 
This would then be the law applicable to the decedent's answer in 
Warren that he was "in (irst class health" if it were not- for the clause 
included in the application which m!l4e the truth of the, representa-
tions a condition for recovery. This clause was,deemed to be a condi-
tion precedent by the court of appeals.u In Massachusetts the view is 
that: 
, The distinction between a warranty and a condidon precedent, 
though sometimes narrow, is neverthe1,ess plain. Such a condition 
is one without the performance of which the contract, although in 
form executed by the parties and delivered, does not spring into 
life. A warranty does not suspend or defeat the operation of the 
contract, but a breach affords either the remedy expressly provided 
in the contract or those furnished by the law." 
Other differences, in addition to this basic distinction, are also illi~ 
portant. One of , the major distinctions is that C.L;, c. 175, §186~ ,does 
not apply to conditions precedent." This means, that, unlikerepresenta-
tions, a condition precedent demands absolute' fulfillment with no test 
of materiality to soften its effect.'11 If the representations covered by a 
condition precedent clause are false in any way, the policy ,is void ab 
initio." In addition, the burden of proof, like the conmWn law ap-
89Id. at sao, 69 N.E.2d at 586. 
'0 Recent Developments, 54 Nw. U.L Rev. 275 (1959-1960). 
'lId. at 278. 
,tWarren v. Confederadon Ufe AIm., 401 "I.2d at 489 n.4. 
48 Evenon 'Y. General Acx:ldent,Fire Ie L1te Alluranceeorp., of Perth, Scotland, 
202 Mala. 169, 17S, 88 N.E.658, 660 (1909).' " . 
"Charles,Heury Ie'Crowley Co. 'Yo' Home 'Ins. Co., M9 Mus. '12S, 212 N.E.2d 240 
(1965); Itrame v. Equitable Life IDa., Co. of IoWa, SSS Mus. 200, 129 N.E.2d 617 
(1955); Lopardi v. John ~c:oc:kM11tual Life IDI. Co., 289, Mala. 492, 1~ N.E. 706 
(1935); Ballard 'Y. Globe Ie Rutgers Fire Ins. Co. of New York, 237 'Mass. 54, 129 
N.E. 290 (1921). 
"Paratore v. John Hancock Mut\l8l Life Ins. Co., S35 Mus. 632, 141 N.E.2d 511 
(1957); Lopardi v. John Hanc:oc:k Mutual Ufe'Ins. Co., 289 Mus; 492~ 194 N.E. 706 
(1935); Ballard v. Globe Ie Rutgers Fire Ins. Co., 2~7 Mus. 54, 129 N.E. 290 (1921). 
""No contractual duty ari8eI under such a policy unleu there baa been mm-
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plicable to warranties, is placed upon the insured to demonstrate that 
he met the condition,47 He must prove, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, that he has fulfilled the requirements of the condition,48 If 
he is unable to do so, a judgment is required by law in the insurer's 
favor,49 If evidence is presented, however, it is usually a question for 
the jury.GO " 
Recognizing the harshness of the law applicable to conditions prece-
dent, the courts normally limit the scope of the conditions, as well as 
demand that for conditions to be effective they must be created clearly 
and expressly. 111 The courts have established the criterion that 
. . . a statement made in application for a policy of insurance 
may become a condition of the policy rather than remain a war-
ranty or representation if: (1) the statement made by the insured 
relates essentially to be insurer's intelligent decision to issue the 
policy; and (2) the statement is made a condition precedent to 
recovery under the policy, either by using the precise words 
"condition precedent" or their equivalent.1I2 
It has been ruled that medical treatment between the time of medical 
examination. and the delivery of the policy could be material in the 
insurer's entry into the contract and is therefore an appropriate subject 
to be made a condition precedent.1iS In addition it has been held that 
the "good health" .of the insured is of suitable character to be made a 
condition precedent to the policy.1i4 
... That an insured is in sound health at the date of the policy 
is clearly a proper subject of a condition precedent .... And the 
matters dealt with in the clause entitled "Policy When Void," 
though of secondary rather than of primary importance, cannot 
be pronounced so immaterial in their bearing on the health of the 
insured . . . that they cannot reasonably be made conditions 
precedent .... 1111 
These decisions affirm the validity of the ordinary "good health" 
pliance with conditions precedent thereto." Lopardi v. John Hancock. Mutual Life 
Ins. Co., 289 Mass. at 496, 194 N.E. at 708. 
47 Kramer v. John Hancock. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 3!!6 Mass. 465, 146 N.E.2d !l57 
(1957); Fondi v. Boston Mutual Life Ins. Co., 224 Mass. 6, 112 N.E. 612 (1916). 
48 Connolly v. John Hancock. Life Ins. Co., !!22 Mass. 678, 79 N.E.2d 189 (1948); 
Fondi v. Boston Mutual Life Ins. Co., 224 Mass. 6, 112 N.E. 612 (1916). 
49 Connolly v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co., !!22 Mass. 678, 68!!, 79 N.E.2d 189. 
192 (1948). 
GO Lee v. Prudential Life Ins. Co., 20!! Mass. 299, 89 N.E. 529 (1909); Gallant v. 
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 167 Mass. 79, 44 N.E. 107!! (1896). 
111 Pahigian v. Manufacturers Life Ins. Co., 549 Mass. 72!!, 212 N.E.2d 240 (1965). 
112Id. at 726, 212 N.E.2d at 242. 
liS Krause v. Equitable Life Ins. Co. of Iowa, !!!!S Mass. 200, 129 N.E.2d 617 (1955). 
Ii4 Lopardi v. John Hancock. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 289 Mass. 492. 194 N.E. 706 
(1935). 
1111 Id. at 496-497. 194 N.E. at 708. 
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clauses in Massachusetts, as conditions precedent. The Warren case is 
unique in that the decedent's affirmation of good health may have been 
incorporated into a valid condition precedent to constitute a "good 
health" clause. If this is true, then Warren may demonstrate a recogni. 
tion by the court of appeals of a change in Massachusetts law applicable 
to "good health" clauses. 
There are three main divisions of opinion in the law applicable to 
"good health" clauses. They are the "apparent good health" school, 
the "change of health" school, and the strict construction, "actual good 
health" schoo1.56 The "apparent good health" doctrine, followed in a 
minority of the states, requires only that the insured must be in ap-
parent good health and be aware of nothing to indicate the contrary.1i7 
Its supporters rationalize its use on the basis that: 
Policies of insurance, ~ other contracts, should be construed 
according to the ordinary sense and meaning of the terms em· 
ployed .... When one says that he is in good health he does not 
mean, and nobody understands him to mean, that he may not 
have a latent disease of which he is wholly unconscious. It is 
doubtless competent for a life insurance company, in its policies, 
to take the expression "good health" out of its common meaning 
and make it exclude every disease, whether latent and unknown 
or not (assuming that any person would ever accept a policy of 
that kind), but it must do so in distinct and unmistakable Ian· 
guage.1I8 
This doctrine gains support when applied to situations where a medical 
examination is given by the insurance company and the insured was 
given a clean bill of health by their physician.1I9 An economic argument 
stressing the equity of possible losses is also advanced to support the 
"apparent good health" view: 
In a situation where the contracting parties expect differing 
results it may be reasonable to impose the loss on the party best 
able to anticipate the harm and make provision for it. An insurer 
is likely to be quite able to estimate these additional costs and 
spread them among its policy holders, lessening the risk to each 
individual insured of his unknown "defects." This allocation 
of risk to the insurer will prevent catastrophic harm to the 
individual insured or his beneficiaries, as contrasted with the 
relatively light impact on the insurer.60 
A narrow majority of the courts have adopted the "change of 
116 Wick, The Good Health Clause - What It Says and What Some Courts Say 
It Says, 25 Ins. Counsel J. 511 (1956) (hereinafter cited as Wick). 
117Id. at 517. 
1i8 Combs v. Equitable Life Ina. Co. of Iowa, 120 F.2d 452, 456 (4th Cir. 1941). 
1i9 Comment, Good. Health Clauses, Conditional Receipts, and the Risk of the 
Insured's Unknown Ailments, 41 So. Cal. L. Rev. 182, 186 (1967-1968). 
60 Id. at 194·195. 
20
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1969 [1969], Art. 20
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1969/iss1/20
§17.15 INSURANCE' 455 
health" doctrine.61 Under this doctrine the "good health" clause 
applies only to changes in the condition of the insured's health between 
the date of the application and medical examination, and the date of 
issuance or delivery of the policy.62 
Often the courts have been led to adopt the "change of health" 
doctrine by the language of the particular "good health" clause at 
issue.6S Clauses calling for delivery in the "continuance of good health" 
are one type which would lead to the "change of health" interpretation. 
"An even clearer example is a clause providing that "insurance shall 
date from the date of approval of this application ... provided that I 
shall then be in the same condition of insurability as shown by this 
application .... "64 With this view, only a subjective change, that is one 
capable of being known by the insured, intervening between applica-
tion and delivery should void the policy.61i In most cases, however, this 
view is not based solely upon the wording of the policy, but rather on 
the idea of equity as expounded by the courts which adopt the "ap-
parent good health" view. In addition, it is contended that having given 
a medical examination itself, the insurance company must be deemed 
to have waived any further obligations, with respect to disclosure, 
regarding the health of the insured prior to the time of the examina-
tion.66 
The third major view, ascribed to by a minority of the states, includ-
ing Massachusetts, is the "actual good health" doctrine, often referred 
to as the "Massachusetts rule."67 Originally enunciated in Gallant v. 
Metropolitan Life Insurance CO.,68 the basic feature of this theory is 
succinctly stated as: 
... The company made its own contract, a part of which was 
that no obligation was assumed by the company unless at the time 
when the policy was issued the insured was "alive and in sound 
health." If in fact the insured at that time was not in sound health, 
then the defendant is not liable on the policy .... 69 
This requirement of good health "in fact" has been demanded by 
courts following the "actual good health" doctrine even in situations 
where the applicant believed himself to be in good health at the time 
of his application and the company satisfied itself by medical examina-
tion that he was insurable, and no subsequent change in his condition 
took place prior to the delivery of the policy.70 
61 Wick, 25 Ins. Counsel J. at 518. 
62 Annot., 1116 A.LR. 1516 (1942). 
63 Wick, 25 Ins. Counsel J. at 518. 
MIbid. 
61i Note, 42 Cornell L.Q. 576 (1956-1957). 
66 Annot., 60 A.L.R.2d 1422, 1456-1457 (1958). 
67 Wick, 25 Ins. Counsel J. 511; Comment, Good Health Clauses, Conditional 
Receipts, and the Risk of the Insured's Unknown Ailments,41 So. Cal. L. Rev. 182, 
186 (1967-1968). 
68167 Mass. 79, 44 N.E. 1075 (1896). 
69Id. at 80-81, 44 N.E. at 1074. 
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When the statement of "good health" is considered to be a condition 
precedent the Massachusetts rule places the burden of proof of good 
health on the insured, or the beneficiary.'11 The question arises whether 
there is a necessity of proving a causal relationship between the death 
of the insured and the preexisting ill health. In Barker v. Metropolitan 
Life Insurance CO.,72 where the insured died of pneuDlonia but was 
suffering from kidney disease before he waS insured, .. . . . the 
court . . . passed over the question· without comment, apparently 
regarding the absence of a causal link between death and ill health 
as immaterial."73 
The rationale of the "actual good health" doctrine is that the parties, 
being free to contract as they pleased, have made actmll good health 
a condition precedent to coverage and the court cannot remake the 
contract.74 The principal complaint, with this objective test, on the 
other hand, is that the insurer, after examining the insured with its 
own doctor, should not be permitted to benefit unjustly from events 
which subsequently reveal that the applicant was not in fact in "good 
health," so long as the applicant's health has not further deteriorated 
prior to delivery of the policy.TII 
The court in Warren ruled that the clause in the application for 
the policy was sufficient to establish a condition precedent, which was 
the basis of its final determination.76 The court compared the language 
of the clause to a similar clause in Lee v. Prudential Life Insurance 
CO.17 In Lee the clause provided: " ... the policy ... shall not take 
effect until the same shall be issued ... while my health is in the same 
condition as described in this application."78 In Warren the clause 
provided: "[A]ny policy ... will not take effect until the ... policy 
has been delivered ... while the facts concerning the insurability ... 
are the same as described in this application . . . ."79 While the dif-
ferences are slight the question arises whether the condition precedent 
10 Barker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 188 Mass. 542, 74 N.E. 945 (1905). 
11 Paratore v. John Hancock :Mutual Life Ins. Co., !1M Mass. 652, 141 N.E.2d 511 
(1957); Connolly v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., !l22 MalIS. 678, 79 N.E.2d 
189 (1948); Amin v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York, 241 Mass. 107, 1M N.E. !l50 
(1922); Lee v. Prudential Life Ins. Co., 20!l Mass. 299, 89 N.E. 52!J (1909). 
72188 Mass. 542, 74 N.E. 945 (1905). 
18 Wick, 2!1 Ins. Counsel J. at !l16. 
74Id. at !II !I. 
711 Note, 42 Cornell L.Q. 576, 581. A common definition of "I~ health" has 
been used by all three groups. "As employed in a life insurance policy the words 
'sound health' refer in general to a state of normal health free from infirmity or 
disease having a direct tendency to shorten life." Connolly v. John Hancock Mutual 
Life Ins. Co., !l22 Mass. 678, 682, 79 N.E.2d 189, 192 (1948). 
76 This can be inferred from the opinion when it states, "Defendant contended 
that the policy never took effect or, alternatively, was voidable for a misrepre-
sentation which increased the risk as a matter of law." 401 F.2d at 488. This result 
is possible only when a condition precedent has been violated. 
'IT 2O!I Mass. 299, 89 N.E. 529 (1909). 
78Id. at SOO-SOI, 89 N.E. at 5SO. 
79 Warren v. Confederation Life Assn., 401 F.2d at 489. 
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in WlJrrenapplies only to the insured's freedom from "symptoms of 
disease" or ·also to his "good health."80 As discussed previously. one's 
statement of "good health" in an application for insurance is considered 
to be an opinion. and not a fact. Therefore it is questionable whether 
the insured's actual good health could be made a condition by the 
clause in question which limited its applicability to the "facts" con-
cerning insurability. The clause in Lee avoided this problem by 
expressly requiring the insured's health to be the same as described 
in the application. The court in that case found this specific standard 
of health sufficient to establish a "good health" condition precedent. 
making the application of the "actual good health" doctrine easier 
than in Warren. where no specific standard was given. 
It may be that this possible ambiguity. the lack of a specific standard 
of "good health" in the Warren application. is what prompted the 
court to state that: "Even condition precedent language. however. 
should be construed against the company. at least to the extent of not 
permitting it to rely upon the literal wording to achieve a result not 
disclosed."sl This undisclosed result, alluded to by the court. might 
also be the establishment of the insured's actual good health as a 
standard applicable to the condition in the application. The court 
attempts to deny this when it waiveringly states: "It may well be that 
the instant provision does not make the truthfulness of the statements 
in the original application a condition precedent; in' other words. that 
the condition is limited to subsequent events."S2 This equivocal state-
ment leads to two distinct interpretations. If it is read as just posing . 
a possibility. but not declaring a position. then the court can be seen 
to be adhering to the old view that a condition precedent requires 
actual. objective fulfillment under all circumstances and under all 
terms provided in the policy as long as a "good health" clause has 
been established. If taken as a statement of fact. however. that is in 
this case the condition is limited to subsequent events. the court can 
be interpreted as altering the standard of "actual good health" to a 
form of the "change of health" standard similar to that derived in 
Bronx Savings Bank v. Weigandt.sa 
The clause in Weigandt provided that: " ... the policy shall not 
take effect until the first premium is paid and the policy delivered 
while the person to be insured is in good health."s, The court adopted 
a "change of health" view interpreting this clause as 
so Warren's answer in the application, which the insurance company argued was 
made a condition precedent by the clause in the policy application, stated that he 
was in "first-class health and free from all symptoms of disease." Id. at 489. Thus 
the court could consider the answer to be totally or partially a condition precedent. 
SlId. at 490. It can be argued, however, that this is not the court's meaning. If 
the "literal" wording were relied on, the limitation of the condition precedent 
clause to "facts" would operate to exclude this "opinion" of good health. 
82 Ibid. 
881 N.Y.2d 545, 156 N.E.2d 848, 60 A.L.lUd 1422 (1956). 
Sf Id. at 550, 1M N.E.2d at 851. 
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. . . sufficiently ambiguous . . . to find . . . in the absence of 
fraud, the policy would become effective upon ... delivery ... in 
the absence of an adverse intervening change of health where the 
applicant is given a medical examination and found to be in 
good health [at the time of the application].8C1 
The court qualified the standard "change of health" doctrine by 
stating: 
An insurer may, "when not restricted by the Legislature, con-
dition the valid inception of a contract of insurance upon the 
existence at the time of perfect and complete health, free even 
from temporary slight impairment; but such ... condition should 
be phrased in clear and unequivocal terms."86 
In this way the Weigandt court adopted an intermediate position 
between the traditional "actual good health" and "change of health" 
doctrines. That is, it held, that an insurer may condition an insurance 
contract on objective good health, if it is done by employing clear 
and precise terms denonstrating an intention to do so" If the policy 
is not so worded, it is to be construed to require a change in the in-
sured's condition, such change to be measured by subjective stan· 
dards.8T 
If the Warren court had considered the condition precedent in the 
application to embrace only the insured's affirmation t() be free from 
"symptoms of disease" and not "first class health," then a subjective 
standard would be applicable also to the condition. This subjective 
standard would not be one of "good health" for by definition "symp-
toms" must be capable of discovery. 
If the Warren opinion is read in the Weigandt interpretation of 
the law applicable to "good health" conditions precedent, then the 
court in Warren would be recognizing a change in the established 
"Massachusetts rule" in favor of a more subjective, insured's point 
of view standard. 
The Warren opinion leads to a third possible, but not probable, 
interpretation. The court could have intended that an objective, 
actual good health criterion was to be used in the period between 
application and delivery. This would be a difficult standard to apply, 
however, as it would require the determination of the exact date of 
the inception of a latent disease, as, according to the court, only la-
tent diseases developing after the date of application would violate 
the condition.88 Because of this difficuJty, the inability ()f determining 
the inception of a latent disease, the employment of a subjective stan-
8C1lbid. 
86Id. at 553, 1M N.E.2d at 852. 
8T See Note, 42 Cornell L.Q. 576. 
88 See Annot., 1M A.L.R. 1516 (1942). for an analysis of the treatment 'given by 
the "change of health" courts on the question of the effect of latent diseases. See 
also Annot .• 100 A.L.R. M2 (1956). 
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dard by the court is presumed. The discussion by the court of "selec-
tion"89 also leads to this conclusion. The court focused on prevention 
of "selection" by the insured as a major aim of conditions precedent. 
This implies that a conscious decision must occur in the mind of the 
insured. To have this happen, some basis for a decision must also 
have occurred. Some symptom must have been observed by or known 
to the insured. 
1£ the court has used subjective standards to determine the effects 
of the insured's affirmation of "good health," the results of such an 
application are still distinguishable from mere representations in an 
insurance policy, in that questions of materiality and intent to de-
ceive would be irrelevent if ill health at the time of application could 
be demonstrated as known to the insured. 
Because of the uncertainty of the court's language, this Weigandt 
interpretation of the Warren opinion must be considered as merely 
a possibility. Even if this interpretation is the correct one, its broader 
applications would be doubtful. Two cogent reasons combine to sup-
port this conclusion. One, this is an extreme case where the wording 
of the condition clause almost compelled a conclusion that it was 
applicable only to the period between the date of application and 
delivery. Two, the court discusses, at length, post application selec-
tion by the insured. The court specifically stated: 
[I]nsurance departments of the states regularly permit companies 
to use condition precedent provisions with respect to the interval 
between the submission of the application and the applicant's 
tender of the premium, or the insurer's delivery of the policy.DO 
1£ read in this Weigandt or modified change of health manner, 
this case does represent a beginning of a possible weakening of the 
strict "actual good health doctrine" in Massachusetts. With the de-
mand for strict construction in reading condition precedent language 
stated by the court, an opportunity is provided to use ambiguities 
in "good health" clauses to soften their often harsh effects, and judge 
the cases on the merits of their particular facts. A specific rule for 
avoiding ambiguities has not, as yet, been established. Therefore, an 
opportunity for further interpretation is available. A useful precedent 
may have been set by Warren, which provides greater equity in this 
area of insurance law where early doctrines have been outmoded by 
the facts of today's large, impersonal insurance market, in which the 
opportunity for equality in the negotiations of a policy is non-exis-
tent. 
WILLIAM PERRIN 
89 Warren v. Confederation Life Assn., 401 F.2d at 489-490. "Selection," as used 
by the court, is the conscious decision by the potential insured, the applicant, either 
to accept or reject the agreed upon coverage on the basis of a possible change in 
his physical condition or insurability that occurs after he was examined by the 
insurers' physician. 
90 Id. at 490. 
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